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of internet forum users1 
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Abstract 
We run an experiment with users of internet message boards. We find that forum 
users cooperate more with partners of their own forum than with partners from a 
different forum but they are equally altruistic when they made a gift to a partner of 
their forum or from another one. We also find that individuals are more active in the 
forums, the more altruistic they are; however, we find no relation between activity in 
the forum and cooperation. These results suggest that the public good provided in 
internet forums is mainly provided by a group of unconditional altruistic group of 
users, and that the feeling of community supports the cooperation in that provision. 
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1. Introduction 
Millions of people around the world spend a significant part of their lives participating 
in virtual communities. From the beginning of the internet (Rheingold, 1993), many 
users share information and have virtual social relationships with other people. In 
recent years, social interaction in the internet through social media like Facebook or 
Twitter has become a phenomenon of first order importance, but internet chats and 
forums have put individuals in contact for a long time. 
These virtual communities work because of the participation of many users who 
share conversation and put knowledge in common. Kollock (1999) studied how an 
economy of gifts and cooperation allows to sustain these communities. Importantly, 
when these communities are open access, the information they provide is a public 
good, which is privately provided through the participation of a myriad of individuals, 
who do not receive any monetary contribution for their participation. 
The large literature on private provision of public goods (Ostrom, 2000) has identified 
a set of required conditions in order to sustain that provision. A fundamental 
requirement is the development of adequate institutions. Moreover, the personal 
characteristics of the individual are fundamental in providing the public good. 
Heterogeneity in the society has become well established, showing the existence of 
conditional cooperators as well as rational egoists (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher 
et al., 2008). 
Use of IT’s, at the same time, has been related with pro-social behavior (even the 
use of Computer Games, as shown in Mengel, 2014). Some recent studies have 
explored some of these aspects in internet users. Bravo (2010) explores why this 
voluntary contribution emerge in the case of mutual-help forums. Many recent studies 
focus on the motivation to write in Wikipedia (Forte and Bruckman, 2005; Wagner 
and Prasarnphanich, 2007). Zhang and Zhu (2011) find in a field experiment that 
people contribute more to Wikipedia because of the social impact of the 
contributions, thus explaining why contribution increases when users of the public 
good increase. It gives empirical support to the experimental evidence of group size 
having an ambiguous but possibly positive effect on contributions (Isaac et al., 1994). 
A recent study shows that size group has nonlinear effects, with an optimal 
intermediate size (Yang et al., 2013).  
As far as we know, we are the first study that uses the methodology of experimental 
economics in order to disentangle motivations of these users. With this aim, we have 
run public good game and the dictator game with a sample of two large internet 
message boards.3  
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We analyze the behavior of internet forum users, and explore if it is related with their 
altruism and tendency to cooperate. Although many internet forums are privately 
owned, it has been found that users feel that they are sharing information in a true 
public good (McLure Wasko and Faraj, 2000). Our hypothesis is that if online 
communities survive, their core users should be likely to contribute to a public good 
and/or to be altruistic people.  
There is few evidence on the relation between laboratory and real life behavior. 
Karlan (2005) shows how the Trust game is able to predict real behavior in 
microcredit takers. Thöni et al (2012) find that most (69%) of the population are 
conditional cooperators and that cooperation choices are driven by preferences and 
beliefs. They also find that survey measures of social capital are significant predictors 
of cooperation behavior in the Danish population. 
We find that level of participation in the community is significantly related with 
altruism, while the relation is weaker with the participation in the public good 
situation. These results suggest that altruism is a more relevant characteristic that 
tendency to collaborate in core participants in this type of communities. This is 
consistent with an altruistic explanation for the cooperation in public goods (Anderson 
et al., 1998), explaining preferences on altruism the cooperation levels in public 
goods (Anderson et al., 2011). Laury and Taylor (2008) found that altruism measured 
in the lab explained contribution to a real public good, but it was also asked to the 
participants in the lab. We relate altruism measured experimentally with the 
contribution to the real public good provided in the forum. 
We run the experiment in both communities asking participants to make a gift or to 
cooperate in the public good with people of the same or of a different community. 
Levels of cooperation and gifts were bigger inside the community, although the 
community effect is significant only for cooperation. 
We find that the role of the community increases levels of cooperation and that more 
participating users tend to be more altruistic, both with people of their community and 
of the other community.  
 
2. The experiment 
We want to study if the subjects who provide the public good of the content of 
internet forums feel themselves likely to establish higher levels of cooperation with 
other members of their (of a different) community, as well as the relation between 
their activity in the forum and their altruism and tendency to cooperate. With this idea, 
we ran an experiment in two Spanish forums, whose users were invited to 
participate. We proposed them two situations: 
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o Gift game. In this game the subject had to decide which part of its endowment 
gives to an anonymous partner. We considered this answer as a measure of 
altruism. 
 
o Public good game. In this game the subject had to decide how much to invest 
with an anonymous partner. The investment of each individual generated a 
public good shared equally. We considered this answer as a measure of the 
tendency to cooperate. 
Subjects decided under two different treatments: half of the sample was informed 
that they were playing with individuals from the same forum, and the other half that 
they were playing with individuals from another forum. For each participant, we took 
also the number of messages written in the forum as well as for how long they had 
been registered. 
We recruited 200 users from two different Spanish internet forums. Forocoches.com 
(Forum 1 from now on) is probably the most popular Spanish forum. Originally 
directed to car users, it has evolved in a general debate forum, where people talk 
about a wide set of topics, mainly with an entertainment objective. Burbuja.info 
(Forum 2) is probably the most popular Spanish forum focused on economic topics. 
50 volunteers were recruited on Forum 1 with a thread looking for participating in an 
experiment that would allow winning a prize.4 This thread was posted on June 27th 
2013, and a new thread was posted on July 7th looking for additional 50 volunteers. 
In the case of Forum 2, we posted a thread looking for 100 volunteers on July 8th. In 
both forums, we were surprised by the high level of responses we received. 
The message in the thread was equal in both forums. In that message, users with an 
account registered in 2012 or earlier were kindly asked to respond the thread if they 
were willing to take part in an experiment where they should answer a short 
questionnaire and in which, depending on their answers, they could win a variable 
prize. Making groups of 50 people, each one of them would be assigned with 2 
different two-digit numbers, such that the one with the same ending number than in 
the First Prize of the following Spanish National Lottery event, would win a prize 
depending on their answers and on the answers of others. 
In the case of Forum 1, we included in the title of the thread the tag “Serious topic”, 
which is used when trolling behavior is not allowed, which is respected usually by the 
users. In the case of Forum 2, we asked for permission for initiating the topic by the 
moderators’ team, who warned in the first answer to our thread that they would not 
allow troll behavior in the topic, which was “officially” authorized by the team of 
moderators.5 
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When people applied for participation, we wrote their names as well as the number 
assigned for the lottery in the initial post of the thread, making transparent this 
information. After that, we sent to each participant a private message through the 
forum including a hyperlink to a Google Form, where they answered seven questions 
step by step. 
Once they clicked in the hyperlink, they entered in a webpage where we explained 
once more the experiment and the prize. We informed them that in the case of 
winning the lottery, their prize would be of €5 (show-up fee) plus an amount 
depending on the decisions taken by her/him and the rest of participants. After that 
they were required to introduce their nickname of the Forum. Then, they were 
presented first with a public good game situation and later with a dictator game 
(framed as a gift situation), or vice versa, in order to control for order effects. In both 
cases, the situation was initially explained and the user was asked to continue only if 
she/he had understood everything. After clicking, they were allowed to answer. 
In the public good game, they were asked to freely allocate up to €10 to a project 
with a random anonymous partner, which had the same option, such that each euro 
invested would pay €0.75 to both members of the pair. These questions were entitled 
as “Your investment”. We framed the dictator game as a gift situation, saying to the 
participant that she/he was allowed to freely give to an unknown participant up to €10 
for her/his potential prize, different from the one paired in the public good situation. 
These questions were entitled as “Your gift”. In both cases, the part of the money 
neither invested nor given remained as part of the prize of the user. Half of 
participants read that their pairs were members of the same forum, while the other 
half read that their pairs were members of a different forum (not specified which one) 
where the experiment was also being conducted. 
Then, subjects were informed that their prize would be also increased by the gift of 
another random user. Finally, they had to fill a short questionnaire, where they were 
asked how many Euros they thought that their random partners had invested and 
given, and they would get one additional euro for their prize if they matched the 
answer of their partner. In the questionnaire they also had to answer if they 
participated in other forums, and how active they were. 
When all subjects completed the experiment, we made random pairs and compute 
the potential prize for each one, and posted it in the first message of the thread, next 
to the nickname of the user and the two numbers of two digits, which were the 
equivalent to their lottery tickets. 
There were a total of 200 volunteers. Half of them played with partners from the 
same forum and half of them with partners from a different forum. Half of them played 
initially the public good game and later the dictator game, and half of them in the 
reverse order.  
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From each participant, we obtained their decisions in the Google Form, as well as the 
date in which they registered in the forum and the number of messages they had 
written up to the moment in which they applied for participation. This information is 
publicly displayed in the forum, next to the nickname of the user. With it we 
generated the variables Age, which accounted for the number of months since the 
users registered in the forum, and Messages, with the number of messages written 
until then. With these two variables we controlled for the implication and participation 
of the user in the virtual community. 
Given the rules proposed to the subjects, the potential prize was theoretically 
between a minimum of €12.50 (show-up fee, full investment and no investment of the 
pair, all money given as gift, no money received and failed prediction about the 
partner behavior) and a maximum of €44.50 (show-up fee, no investment and full 
investment of the pair, no money given as gift and €10 received, and answering 
correctly the prize of the partners). In the experiment, the minimum and maximum 
potential real prizes were of €14.50 and €42.50, respectively. The prizes that won the 
lottery were of €25, €26.50, €28.75 and €30.25. The prizes were given trough 
Amazon Gift Cards. 
 
3. Hypothesis 
Users of forums spend a significant part of their time reading and writing in them. 
Participation varies strongly, but there is typically a core group of users who 
participate very often (Arthur, 2006). These users are the main responsible for 
generating a public good, the content included in the forum, which many other users 
can freely enjoyed. Why do these users contribute?  
We expected that the more active individuals in the forums, more altruistic and more 
they would cooperate in the public good. We propose therefore the following 
hypothesis, expecting to reject it: 
 H.1 Subjects with more messages do not give and invest more. 
Those individuals registered for a longer time in the forum should be more conscious 
of the fact that they belong to an informal institution where they are cooperating. This 
leads to our following hypothesis, which we also expect to reject: 
 H.2 Subjects registered for a longer time do not invest more. 
We also expect that people is more confident with respect to their forum partners, so 
that investment level should be higher when the partner is from the same forum. At 
the same time, if agents decide to give in a purely altruistic manner, they do not treat 
differently people from the other forum. Thus we expect to reject the first part and to 
accept the second of the following: 
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 H.3 Subjects invest and give the same when partners are from the same 
forum or from other forum. 
We think that people who have spent more time in a given forum should have a 
sense of belonging to a community. Therefore we expect that beliefs on others’ 
behavior are strongly for those people registered for a longer time and more 
participative. 
 H.4 Subjects with more messages and registered for a longer time believe that 
partners will invest and give more. 
Finally, we hypothesized that people believe that partners of their own forum is more 
likely to invest and give more, so we expect to reject: 
 H.5 Subjects believe that people do not give and do not invest more when 
partners are from the same forum.  
4. Results 
In Table 1, we present some descriptive statistics of our data. 
  
Age Messages Investment Gift 
Other  
Investment 
Other  
Gift 
Mean 43,94 2966,33 6,69 5,09 5,57 3,73 
Std Dev 24,54 4692,43 3,19 3,10 3,25 3,10 
Median 41 1238 7 5 5 4 
Max 110 28217 10 10 10 10 
Min 7 4 0 0 0 0 
      Table 1 
Our experimental subjects had been registered in the forums for an average of 44 
months, with a standard deviation of 24 (2 years) and a median of 41 months. The 
subject with the oldest forum account was registered for 9 years and 2 months when 
we run the experiment. The average accumulated number of messages was of 
almost 3000, which means that our experimental subjects, in average, had written 
around 67 messages monthly. This is a measure of how active each user is in the 
forum, and the data had a large variability, with a maximum of a user with more than 
28000 messages. 
In a first approximation to the data, we find that subjects invest and give a relatively 
high proportion of their endowmen, 6.69 and 5.09, in average. As expected, and due 
to that it partially returns to the subject, the investment is in average higher than the 
gift, €1.60. Only 14% of the subjects gave more than they invested. It is also relevant 
that they believe, in average, that they have invested €1.12 more than their partners 
and given €1.36 more. In the Appendix A we present these descriptive statistics 
disaggregated by Forum and depending on whether the pairs were of the same or of 
a different forum. 
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With respect to decisions, we observed a weak relation between gift and investment, 
both the own and the predicted by the partner. We observe a stronger relation 
between the investment of the subject and the users’ beliefs of the investment of the 
partner, and between own gift and the belief on the gift of the partner, as we show in 
Figure 1. 
We find a difference in decisions between the same and a different forum in all 
cases. As it can be observed in Figure 2, individuals invested and gave less when 
the partner was from a different forum. Consistently with this fact, we also observe 
that beliefs on actions of the partner are systematically smaller when the partner was 
from a different forum. In Figure 2 we plot the mean of each decision, with the 
associated standard errors. Although the difference between a partner from the own 
forum and an unknown one is systematic, we point that it is significant only in the 
case of investment.  
 
Figure 2 
In order to disentangle if decisions of investment and gift can be explained by the 
experience in the forum of each user, we run a regression analysis. We explore using 
OLS if the level of Investment and Gift can be explained by the level of participation 
of the user (Messages, in thousands) and the time the user was registered in the 
forum (Age, in months). Moreover, we include in this regression three dummy 
variables. Forum 1 takes the value 1 if the user belonged to Forum 1 (0 otherwise), 
and we use it to capture forum-specific conditions. Own takes the value 1 when the 
user was playing with a partner of the same forum. InvGift takes the value 1 when the 
subject answered in the first place to the Public Good game. 
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Figure 1 
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In Table 2 we report the results of these regressions in Models (1) and (3). Models 
(2) and (4) include as explanatory variable the belief of the subject on the action of 
the associate partner. For each model we report the coefficients of the initial 
regression on the left and those coefficients that survive after removing the non 
significant ones on the right. 
  Investment   Gift 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Forum 1     0,846*  0,842* 0,274 
 
  0,215   0,14   
  0,463 0,446 0,401 
 
  0,441   0,367   
InvGift -0,078 
 
-0,135 
 
  
 -
1,363*** 
 -
1,380*** 
-0,604   
  0,462 
 
0,395 
 
  0,441 0,438 0,375   
Own 0,743 0,792* 0,581 
 
  0,209   0,363   
  0,459 0,446 0,393 
 
  0,438   0,365   
Age 0,005 
 
0,000 
 
  0,015 0,016* 0,009   
  0,01 
 
0,008 
 
  0,009 0,008 0,008   
Messages 0,011 
 
-0,004 
 
  0,078 0,083* 0,031   
  0,05 
 
0,043 
 
  0,048 0,046 0,04   
BeliefInv 
  
0,515*** 0,527***   
 
      
  
  
0,061 0,059   
 
      
BeliefGift 
  
  
 
  
 
  0,559*** 0,589*** 
  
  
  
 
  
 
  0,06 0,058 
Cons 6,573*** 6,711*** 3,757*** 3,747***   4,898*** 4,839*** 2,858*** 2,896*** 
  0,573 0,387 0,597 0,38   0,554 0,466 0,51 0,279 
F 1,39 3,35 13,64 79,88   2,9 4,72 18,11 104,53 
P-Value F 0,23 0,037 0,000 0,000   0,0151 0,003 0,000 0,000 
R2 0,035 0,033 0,298 0,288   0,0695 0,067 0,36 0,346 
Adj R2 0,01 0,023 0,276 0,284   0,0456 0,053 0,34 0,342 
Significant coefficients in bold. ***, ** and * means significantly at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. N=200. 
Table 2 
 
When we include beliefs on actions of other as explanatory, the model increases 
dramatically its explanatory power (adjusted R2 is multiplied by 7 or more). However, 
we consider that we measure very closed concepts when we use the actions of the 
subject and their beliefs on actions of the partner; second, we ask their opinions 
immediately after their decisions, thus using these beliefs as exogenous in the 
explanation of own decisions is not fully sensible. In fact, when we include it, the 
beliefs eliminate any possible explanatory power of the rest of variables. 
When we focus our attention in the models that exclude beliefs, we find significant 
effects of several variables. In the case of Investment, we find that members of 
Forum 1 invested significantly more, and also that individuals invested more when 
their partner was of the same forum. According to this result, we reject our 
11 
 
Hypothesis 3. But we do not find evidence that supports a strong level of cooperation 
in the public good game among more active users of the forums or between users 
who were registered for a longer time, so we only reject the first part (related to 
giving) of our Hypothesis 1 and we accept our Hypothesis 2. We do find evidence of 
a higher altruism of these more active users. We find each 1000 thousand messages 
in the forum implied a gift 8 cents higher, and that for each month registered in the 
forum, subjects gave 1.6 cents more (19.2 cents for each year).This supports the 
hypothesis of a higher level of altruism of those subjects that form the core of the 
users in the forum. Therefore we obtain the following results: 
 R1. More active internet forum users do not tend to cooperate more but 
are more altruistic. 
 R2. Users participating in internet forums for a longer time do not tend to 
cooperate more. However, they are more altruistic. 
 R3. Users of internet forums have a higher level of confidence in their 
community, so that they invest more with their partners. They are not more 
generous with people in the same forum, so that they are not conditionally 
altruist.  
We also note that we had an order effect in our data that affected level of altruism. 
Subjects who decided initially the public good, were later more likely to give to an 
unknown partner. Remarkable, we find that explanatory power of these models is in 
general very low, represented by a low R2. It indicates that there are many other 
factors that we did not take into account in our study.  
It is possible that in both communities Messages and Age have different meanings, 
i.e., the sense of belonging could differ between communities. However, if we 
intersect Age and Message with Forum 1 and Own, the intersected variables are not 
significant in any regression (see Appendix B). This suggests that there is no 
difference in the behavior that depends on Message and Age between both forums, 
and that these variables do not affect differently the behavior with respect to people 
in the same or from the other forum. 
Finally, in Table 3 we explore the beliefs of the participants over the actions of others. 
We assume that they were strongly influenced by their own actions, but the fact of 
being an incentivized question may generate a more sensible answer.  
We find that beliefs on others’ investment do not differ depending on age or 
messages, as expected after observing that these variables did not affect investment 
decisions. This shows that neither individuals with a longer history in the forum nor 
more active users have higher levels of confidence on others. However, we find that 
more active users do believe that others are more altruistic, while it is not true for 
individuals who had been registered for a longer time. This is consistent with more 
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active people having a nicer view of their partners in the forums, while it is not 
necessarily true for people registered for a longer time. 
 
 
Investment of the partner   Gift of the partner 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Forum 1  1,109** 1,12** 0,662  0,672*   0,134 
 
0,0136   
  0,469 0,454 0,404 0,39   0,441 
 
0,367   
InvGift 0,112 
 
0,153 
 
   -1,357***  -1,275*** -0,596   
  0,468 
 
0,4 
 
  0,44 0,431 0,375   
Own 0,316 
 
-0,078 
 
  0,309 
 
0,192   
  0,465 
 
0,401 
 
  0,438 
 
0,364   
Age 0,011 
 
0,008 
 
  0,01 
 
0,001   
  0,01 
 
0,008 
 
  0,009 
 
0,008   
Messages -0,013 
 
-0,008 
 
  0,082* 0,093** 0,039   
  0,051 
 
0,043 
 
  0,048 0,046 0,04   
Investment 
  
0,529*** 0,531***   
  
    
  
  
0,062 0,061   
  
    
Gift 
  
  
 
  
  
0,559*** 0,586*** 
  
  
  
 
  
  
0,0597 0,057 
Cons 5,465*** 6,135*** 1,987*** 2,358***   3,647*** 4,09*** 0,911* 0,742** 
  0,589 0,321 0,649 0,514   0,554 0,321 0,545 0,432 
F 1,68 6,09 13,97 41,82   2,71 5,75 17,89 104,53 
P-Value F 0,141 0,015 0,000 0,000   0,022 0,004 0,000 0,000 
R2 0,042 0,03 0,303 0,298   0,065 0,055 0,357 0,346 
Adj R2 0,017 0,025 0,281 0,291   0,041 0,046 0,337 0,342 
Significant coefficients in bold. ***, ** and * means significantly at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. N=200. 
Table 3 
 
 R.4 Subjects registered for a longer time believe neither their partners 
will invest nor give more. More active subjects do not believe that their 
partners invest more, but believe that their partners are more altruistic. 
 
4.1 The forum is not generated by the rational egoists 
Up to now we have found that messages (cooperation in the creation of the real 
public good) are correlated with altruism but not with the cooperation level in the 
public good game. As Figure 2 shows, there is a dramatic difference between the 
level of participation in the forum between those users who gave nothing and a 
positive amount, and it also exists between those who invested 0 or a positive 
amount, although differences in this case are smaller. However, there are no 
differences between those who gave or invested everything and the rest of people. 
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These figures suggest that it is not a matter of being rational egoist which drives the 
non cooperation in a real public good; what we observe is that the people who are 
completely non altruistic are those who more clearly do not cooperate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Users of internet forums generate a public good when they provide free content that 
can be accessed by other users. We run an experiment in order to study cooperation 
and altruism between forum users, as well as how belonging to a community 
determines these behaviors. 
We find that forum users do not tend to cooperate more in a public good experiment 
when they contribute more to the forum. However, we find that those users more 
active in the forum have a higher level of altruism and believe also that other 
individuals are more altruistic. These results suggest that one relevant explanation of 
the success of internet forums is the existence of a core group of altruistic users. 
We also find evidence of a feeling of community inside the forums. It makes people 
more likely to cooperate with partners from the same forum. Therefore, the 
construction of such an identity seems also important for the success of the forum in 
the provision of its public good. Altruism of the participants is not conditioned on 
being directed to members of their own community. 
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This experiment sheds light on how internet forums work and continuously provide a 
completely privately generated public good. We expect in the future to make a more 
detailed and general study of the behavior of internet forums, using other 
standardized experimental methods. 
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7. Appendix A 
Here we present the descriptive statistics of each subgroup: 
 
Partners of Own Board 
 
Partners of Other Board 
 
Forum  
1 
  
Age Messages Investment Gift 
Other 
Investment 
Other 
Gift 
 
  
Age Messages Investment Gift 
Other 
Investment 
Other 
Gift 
Forum  
1 
Mean 55,42 4518,26 7,54 5,54 6,38 4,22 
 
Mean 35,94 3572,18 6,67 5,08 5,89 3,58 
Std Dev 27,43 7007,99 2,34 2,97 3,08 3,23 
 
Std Dev 22,63 4680,91 3,30 3,13 3,19 3,06 
Median 55 1216 7,5 5 5 5 
 
Median 30 1930,5 7 5 5 4 
Max 110 28217 10 10 10 10 
 
Max 104 20154 10 10 10 10 
Min 11 53 3 0 0 0 
 
Min 7 19 0 0 0 0 
                 
Forum  
2 
  
Age Messages Investment Gift 
Other 
Investment 
Other 
Gift 
 
  
Age Messages Investment Gift 
Other 
Investment 
Other 
Gift 
Forum  
2 
Mean 42,22 1795,20 6,62 5,03 5,19 3,67 
 
Mean 42,22 1979,66 5,91 4,72 4,84 3,44 
Std Dev 23,37 2377,93 3,55 3,44 3,24 3,17 
 
Std Dev 23,37 2742,49 3,33 2,89 3,35 2,94 
Median 39 848,5 7,75 5 5 4 
 
Median 39 1001,5 5 5 5 3 
Max 90 13429 10 10 10 10 
 
Max 90 13668 10 10 10 10 
Min 8 4 0 0 0 0 
 
Min 8 7 0 0 0 0 
 
Partners of Own Board 
 
Partners of Other Board 
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8. Appendix B 
Regressions where we intersect Message and Age with Forum 1 and Own:  
  Investment   Gift 
Forum 1 -0,37 
 
  -0,303   
  1,039 
 
  0,992   
InvGift -0,064 
 
   -1,329***  -1,380*** 
  0,473 
 
  0,451 0,438 
Own 1,51 0,792*   1,056   
  1,154 0,449   1,102   
Age 0,011 
 
  0,025 0,016* 
  0,018 
 
  0,169 0,008 
Messages 0,075 
 
  0,117 0,083* 
  0,094 
 
  0,09 0,046 
ForumXOwn  -0,301 
 
  0,057   
  0,97 
 
  0,926   
ForumXAge -0,008 
 
  -0,003   
  0,02 
 
  0,189   
ForumXMessages -0,007 
 
  0,058   
  0,141 
 
  0,135   
OwnXAge -0,006 
 
  -0,015   
  0,02 
 
  0,926   
OwnXMessages -0,134 
 
  -0,078   
  0,109 
 
  0,104   
Cons 6,032*** 6,29***   4,443*** 4,839*** 
  0,827 0,318   0,79 0,466 
N 200 200   200 200 
F 0,89 3,1   1,61 4,72 
P-Value F 0,542 0,08   0,106 0,003 
R2 0,045 0,015   0,079 0,067 
Adj R2 -0,005 0,011   0,03 0,053 
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9. Appendix C 
Initial thread 
We reproduce here, in English, the initial message posted on the thread where 
we were recruiting volunteers and where we posted the prizes. Original threads 
(in Spanish) can be visited in Forocoches.com (first thread: 
http://goo.gl/EzK7Ao; second thread: http://goo.gl/oFZEVv ) and in Burbuja.info 
(http://goo.gl/pdtSy2 ). 
Title: Collaborate in an experiment and participate in a lottery (2012 accounts 
or before) (serious topic) 
Message: Good morning mates, 
I would like you help me with a small experiment. Among the 50 participants I 
will give a prize of a a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 42.5 euros, depending 
on your decisions, and that the winner will receive with an Amazon Gift Card. 
The process will be as follows: 
1. If you want to participate, ask it by answering this thread, and I will do a 
list editing this message with all of you, ordered by time. Only users with 
accounts from 2012 or before are allowed to participate. 
2. Once the inscription process finishes, every participant (the first 50 
people) will receive 2 correlative numbers (the numbers 00 and 01 for the 
first one, the numbers 02 and 03 for the second one,… and so on). 
3. I will send a private message to each participant with a hyperlink, in order 
to fill a questionnaire, only with 6 short questions (2-3 minutes). 
4. When everyone answers, I will calculate the prize that everyone may win 
and I will post it in this message. 
5. The prize that each one may obtain will be posted before the day of the 
lottery. The person with the two last digits of the first prize of ths Spanish 
National Lottery on the next Saturday [date] will be the winner, and I will 
contact her/him in order to give her/him the gift card. 
The prize will depend on the decisions you take and that will be detailed in 
the questionnaire. 
Finally, make it clear that we will not distribute any private information. 
Thank you very much for your attention and ¡good luck! 
P.D.- Remeber that only the first 50 people will participate. 
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Private message 
Participants received a hyperlink to a Google Form. An example of the 
private message received by each user follows: 
Title: Experiment and lottery 
Message: Good morning, 
I give you the hyperlink to the questionnaire and lottery, in order to fill it: 
[Hyperlink] 
Thank you very much for your participation 
Questionnaire 
There were eight different forms, depending on: the message board of the 
subject; if her/his partners were of the same/different forum; if the user 
answered first the public game or the dictator game. An example of the 
questionnaires (in Spanish) can be visited here: http://goo.gl/J1Cg2 
We reproduce now the screens observed by each subject: 
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FIRST SCREEN: 
Experiment 
*Compulsory 
¡Wellcome! 
Thank you very much for your participation. As you know, you have received two numbers 
that  will allow you to be able to win a prize if the two last digits of the first prize of the 
National Lottery next Staurday [DATE] coincide with your numbers. If you win, the prize 
will be of 5 euros plus an additional money that will depend on your decisions and on 
decisions of other participants. The prize will be given with an Amazon Gift Card. In the 
experiment are also participating users from a message board different from [Message board 
of the subject]. We are going to assign you  random pairs among the participants of the other 
message board, such that your decisions will affect the final prize you will opt. 
Please, introduce your nickname * 
 
This question is compulsory. 
Continue 
 
SECOND SCREEN: 
Experiment 
Your gift 
Now you will be assigned a random participant from a message board different 
from [Message board of the subject]. You have 10 euros to decide how many 
you want to give to this random mate. The money you give him will increase 
her/his prize if she/he is the winner. The money you do not give will remain as 
part as your prize. The only connection between the individual you are paired 
and you will be the gift that you send her/him. If you have understood how this 
works, click to continue. 
Back - Continue 
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THIRD SCREEN: 
Experiment 
*Compulsory 
Your gift 
Remember, each euro you give will go to your mate of the message board different from 
yours. Each euro you do not give will remain as part of your prize if you are the winner. 
Introduce the amount of money you want to give, 
from 0 to 10 euros. You can introduce decimal 
numbers. * 
 
This question is compulsory. 
 Back - Continue 
 
 
 
FOURTH SCREEN: 
Experiment 
Your investment 
You and another participant, from the message board different from [Message board of the subject], 
and different from the previous participat you were paired, that will be assigned to you at random, 
have 10 euros each one in order to decide how much to invest. The money that both of you decide to 
invest will multiply by 1.5 and will be split equally among both of you. That is, for each euro that you 
decide to invest, 0.75 cents will come back to you and 0.75 cents will be received by your random 
partner. The money that you do not invest will be yours. If you have understood correctly, click to 
decide.  
 Back - Continue 
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FIFTH SCREEN: 
Experiment 
*Compulsory 
Your investment 
Remember, for each euro you invest, 0.75 will come back to you and 0.75 euros will go to 
your mate from the message board different to [Message Board of the subject], and the same 
will occur with her/his investment.  
Introduce your Money to invest, from 0 to 10 euros. 
You can introduce decimal numbers. * 
 
This question is compulsory. 
 Back - Continue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIXTH SCREEN: 
Experiment 
WARNING 
Your potential prize will be increased also by the gift from a random participant, from the message 
board different to [Message board of the participant], and different to that participat that will receive 
your gift. Soon, and previous to the date of the Lottery, we will edit in the thread we opened in the 
forum the potential prizes for each one of you, once all participants have taken their decisions. 
 Back - Continue 
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SEVENTH SCREEN: 
Experiment 
*Compulsory 
Final Questionnaire 
We have almoust finished. Now we would want you answer a short questionnaire. 
How many Euros do you believe that your mate has 
invested? * 
If you match it, your prize will be increased in 1 additional euro: 
 
This question is compulsory. 
How many Euros do you believe that has given the 
mate that will increase your prize? * 
If you match it, your prize will be increased in 1 additional euro: 
 
This question is compulsory. 
Do you participate in other internet boards? Which 
ones? * 
This question is compulsory.  
 
 
How many messages has you approximately posted 
in those boards? * 
If you do not participate in other boeards, just write “No”.  
 
This question is compulsory. 
 
 Back - Continue 
 
 
 
